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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1999 Southern Networks deployed the Open Text Livelink knowledge management
system (KMS). Livelink allowed for the centralization of key corporate applications
and associated content at a global, regional, line-of-business, departmental and
personal level. Prior to the implementation of Livelink on an enterprise scale, the
corporation’s 94,500 employees relied on fragmented departmental web pages which
were scattered across eleven different Web servers making the task of finding
information very difficult. This paper describes how the process of knowledge
transfer at Southern Networks changed with the deployment of Livelink and how it
enabled the automation of workflows through the company’s Web-based Intranet. The
paper also provides an insight into how KMS empowered employees, at least until the
organization significantly downsized in 2001. The importance of this paper is in
highlighting the role of people in the success of KMS and to provide examples of the
knowledge sharing dynamics.
ORGANIZATION BACKGROUND
The Early Days
Southern Networks Corporation, formerly known as SouthTel Limited, is a leading
telecommunications equipment manufacturer with headquarters in Texas, USA. It has
a long history dating back to the First World War when it manufactured radios and
thereafter television sets. In the 1960s SouthTel began to manufacture digital
switching systems, supplying operators throughout North America. They dominated
circuit-switching technology in the public and private network space for decades until
the rise of Internet Protocol (IP). SouthTel had an employee base of about 60,000
people located in over 150 countries in the mid-90s. However, in 1998, a strategic
decision was made by the CEO to make a “right angle turn” towards IP infrastructure,
and merger plans were announced between SouthTel and Fiber Networks,
instantaneously growing the workforce to 95,000 employees. While the new company
Southern Networks profited from the timing of the merger in the short term (as stock
market speculators predicted massive profits), the price of the company’s shares
plummeted from US$99 to US$0.40 within a period of two year. In real terms,
Southern Networks’ capitalization fell from $420 billion in September 2000 to less
than $10 billion in August 2002. A saturated market and unrealistic business plans
1

Southern Networks is a fictitious name that has been used to protect the organization in this real-life
case study. Company products and application names have also been changed to this end.

were blamed for the downturn (Figure 1). More recently accounting scandals have
been reported.
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Figure 1. Southern Networks’ Quarterly Revenues (Q4 1997 – Q4 2001)
Organization Structure
The organization is divided into three regions for administrative purposes: The
Americas (containing both North and South America), Europe and the Middle East
(EME), and Asia (including Australia and New Zealand). Each region has a president
who is in charge of the sales performance for each country within that jurisdiction.
Each country has account teams and business development managers who are tied to a
given product portfolio and report to a country manager. The support functions
include: pre and post sales engineering, global professional services, global customer
care, supply chain operations, human resources, information services, finance,
marketing and legal. The process from the point of getting business to the point of
delivery can be seen in Figure 2.

Customer Win Form/
Bid
Relationship
Support

Customer
Order

Customer
Pre Sales
Engineering

Unified
Network
Solution

Customer
Post Sales
Engineering

Supply
Chain
Management

Customer
Care &
Support

Billing

Figure 2. Southern Networks’ End-to-End Sales-Delivery Process
This case is written from the perspective of the Network Planning (NP) team located
in Australia between 1995 and 2005. The NP team reported to the Professional
Services support cluster under Customer Care Asia, and the broader Service Provider
and Carrier Group (Table 1).
Table 1. Organization Chart
CORP- Global
President and CEO
SPC- Global
President, Service Provider and Carrier Group
SPC- Regional
President, SPC, Asia
SPC- Country
Vice President, Customer Care
SPC- Australia
Director, Business and Network Planning
SPC- Australia
Manager, Network Planning

The Workforce
Today Southern Networks employs about 33,000 people, two-thirds of which are
engineers. This is far from the burgeoning figure it employed at its peak of 94,500 in
December 2000 when it acquired over 16 companies in a single quarter. At that time
the market for skilled and scarce resources was so competitive that the company was
prepared to pay its employees $3,000 USD for successful referrals (in addition to the
new hire receiving a healthy lump sum to begin work immediately). In well-known
high-tech valleys in the United States, competing companies were so aggressively
poaching staff that a contract-based ‘ceasefire’ was declared between a number of
leading organizations, preventing an employee from joining a competing firm within a
six month period. Expansion was in the air, with large budgets allocated to the
refurbishment of lavish office space and off-site employee team-building exercises.
Authorization levels were also relaxed and sign-offs for amounts of $5,000 USD
could be done by any manager without higher approval. The reigns were pulled back
in February of 2001 when executives realized that the risks they had taken to
accelerate the company’s market position had backfired. In one small research and
development regional office in Australia, 50 of the 60 new graduate hires (some of
whom had already been given a relocation allowance) were made redundant on the
spot and given a 3-month redundancy package. By the end of 2001, the company had
shed almost half its workforce in an amazing fall from grace (Figure 3). Whole
departments were being slashed in a bid to decrease operational expenses and make
profits look better.

Dec 99 Company changes strategic focus
83,500

Dec 00 Acquisitions increase headcount
94,500

Jun 01 29,500 staff made redundant due to outsourcing
65,000

Dec 01 16,500 further job cuts due to profit losses
48,500

Mar 02 small manufacturing plant closure
48,000

Aug 04 company continues to spiral down
35,000

Sep 06 accounting scandal further losses
33,000

Figure 3. Southern Networks’ Downsizing Profile
The Products
Southern Networks have five lines of business (LoB): Carrier Voice over IP, Optical
Long Haul Networks, Metro Networks, Wireless Networks, and eBusiness Solutions
(Figure 4). While there is a reshuffle and re-badge of their distinct lines-of-business
every couple of years, they mostly serve the needs of public network carriers, in the

wireline, wireless and cable spaces. After the 2001 crisis, Southern Networks decided
to change their strategic direction and only deal with customers that had real money to
spend. This did not mean that they ignored enterprise-class customers but were
merely wary of beginning negotiations with customers that were not serious about
buying and just wanted free consulting advice. Southern Networks likewise stopped
manufacturing a great number of their products that were unrelated to their core
business. In addition, after the number of acquisitions in the late 90s, Southern
Networks had too many products on their shelf and decided to phase out overlapping
products that had similar functionality, or products that just had too low a margin. At
one stage too many products were blamed for losses in sales that corresponded to
customer confusion and internal product strategy wars. Others blamed the losses on
the turbulence caused by over-inflated bandwidth predictions in the global
telecommunications sector.
Revenue by Line of Business (2001)

Wireless
Networks
13%
Metro
Networks
15%

eBusiness
Solutions
7%

Carrier
VoIP
25%

Optical
Long Haul
Networks
40%

Figure 4. Annual Revenue Breakdown by Line of Business (LOB) for December 2001
The Customers
The customers of Southern are mostly made up of large multinational global players.
Southern Networks have supplied telecommunications equipment to the vast majority
of the top fifty Fortune 500 companies. Smaller enterprise players like large
businesses spanning a variety of industry sectors are also important to Southern’s
sustained revenue. After all, it was in the early 90s that SouthTel became particularly
well-known for their PABX solutions. Today Southern Networks has a presence in
every continent- they are particularly looking at capturing some part of the lucrative
People’s Republic of China market and entering into a number of joint ventures with
local players. While they still maintain a presence in countries like Singapore and
Thailand, their biggest opportunities in Asia are in China and India.
Current Instability
Unfortunately, the latest results report that Southern Networks has had a loss of $360
million, or 9 cents per share in the last quarter, for the fourth successive quarter. This
is highly problematic indicating the company has never quite recovered from the
massive slump it went through in 2001. In 2004 revenues were about $US10 billion
and their net income about $US60 million. The figures for 2005 showed revenues to
be about $US8 billion and predictions for 2006 indicate an even further drop in

revenues. Further redundancies are looming- and one UK laboratory has already
announced 3,000 more job losses in the next three months.
With so many redundancies since the glory days of 1999, staff morale has been a
major issue throughout the changes of the organization downsizing. While whole
laboratories were closed down, there were some that remained opened but opted for
eliminating particular departments over others. In some instances, friends and family
were divided by the downsizing, which was costly to productivity, as lives were
impacted. The company slogan “bringing people together” and the corresponding
advertising theme song which was based on a 1960s hit single, did not hold up very
long after all the hype had worn off. While downsizing had the temporary effect of
making earnings look better to shareholders, continuing to cull one’s workforce would
inevitably have major repercussions. Band-aid measures consisting of impromptu
business plans and strategies to keep shareholders happy are no solution for long-term
woes.
How to continue to function competitively when an organization is in a state of flux,
particularly how to manage knowledge as people come and go, is explored in the
remainder of this case. The main objective of the paper is to tell the story of the
impact that Open Text Livelink had on 95,000 employees and their information
sharing practices in a corporation that spanned a presence in over 150 countries
between 1996 and 2002. The before, during, and after KMS snapshots are presented
to bring to the fore those overriding challenges, struggles and subsequent successes
that follow an implementation of a large-scale eBusiness solution. In addition
knowledge transfer dynamics in the company are explored, as are the effects of
downsizing on the value of knowledge management.
SETTING THE STAGE
Knowledge management is defined as “the systemic and organizationally specified
process for acquiring, organizing, and communicating knowledge of employees so
that other employees may make use of it to be more effective and productive in their
work” (Hahn & Subramani 2000, p. 302). It then follows that a knowledge
management system (KMS) are all those components (software, hardware, people and
processes) that support knowledge management initiatives. These may include but are
not limited to work flow maps, web sites, portals, document management systems,
customer relationship management (CRM), data warehousing, data mining processes,
virtual teams, contact lists, databases, collaboration tools, applications and news
(Davenport & Prusak 1998; Jashapara 2004). Although a term that is often used
interchangeably with document management and information management,
knowledge management seeks the higher ideal of wisdom, the tying together of the
tacit and explicit realms. As Agostini et al. (2003) add: “knowledge is not important
per se, instead the process of knowing, learning, and creating knowledge is the
relevant aspect” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Leitch & Rosen (2001) believe
knowledge management is a misnomer and prefer the term knowledge processes.
Today leading organizations have adopted the current notion of business intelligence
to describe the coming together of all these fundamental knowledge concepts.
Knowledge Management System Features
Livelink is a knowledge management and collaboration enterprise system. It allows
employees to configure project workspaces, add folders, documents and web links,

check in and out documents, maintain file versions, create aliases of documents so
that there is no redundancy of information, discussion threads, favourites, news
tickers, news channels, reports, document reservation, perform searches and queries,
create tasks and define workflows, view documents, and an ability to set permissions
via an access control mechanism. Livelink allows for the creation of workspaces
which can be set at differing levels- from personal workspaces only visible to the
individual employee, to department-wide workspaces that can be seen by colleagues,
to corporate-wide workspaces that can be seen by the whole organization. Typically
network planning projects run at the departmental level, while portal links relevant to
all employees are located on corporate-wide workspaces (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. High-level Knowledge Management System Architecture
Livelink at Southern Networks was implemented using an Intel server platform on an
NT Server 4.0 operating system. The web server that was utilized was Microsoft IIS
4.0. The chosen database was Oracle 8i and the web browser platform was Internet
Explorer 5.01. The KMS Livelink server acted as a back end to the web server that
received transactions, and a front end for the relational database management system.
Livelink was deployed in clusters with numerous servers residing each in The
Americas and EME, and one in Asia in Hong Kong, for a total of eight Livelink
server instances. Each cluster catered for about 10,000 employees with system
performance being maintained even during peak loads. One of the biggest advantages
of Livelink was that administration for the system could be done at a local level. This
was important as the information services department (ISD) was made redundant in
mid-2001, after Southern Networks decided to outsource the competency. Each
instance of Livelink required one contractor 24x7 to be allotted to its operation, save
for the initial installation which required specialized set-up and associated portal
development.
KMS Deployment
Livelink was deployed at Southern Networks in a staggered fashion. The company
had long considered a virtual team/portfolio management approach to doing business.
Indeed today in Australia, only the senior executive team have fixed office locations,

with the rest of the employee base using temporary workstations and being pulled
together and apart dependent on the opportunity at hand. However, the notion of
virtual teams struck at the core of the way the business ran. Previously, SouthTel had
been known for its exhaustive development and manufacturing processes, at the cost
of time-to-market. SouthTel’s solutions were always considered the Rolls-Royce
telecoms solution, expensive yet very reliable and robust. The Internet however, was
set to change the way people worked and the way corporations did business,
especially as customer-to-supplier expectations were increasing and product
innovation cycles were decreasing.
In 1997, the Wireless Group in North America purchased a single instance of Livelink
for the main purpose of competitive intelligence gathering. Although there were a
number of groups that showed disquiet about the legacy Intranet, it was not until 1999
that another instance of Livelink was purchased by the Design and Engineering
Group. This group was interested in using knowledge management to develop
advanced software technology products. It took until 2000 for a corporate wide basic
Livelink system to be purchased allowing for previously disparate applications to be
centralized onto a common portal (Figure 6). The data population of Livelink
occurred in a haphazard fashion, at least at the grassroots level. From the perspective
of the network planning employees (which numbered about 20 in all of Asia) there
was little training provided, little preparation and planning for how to move forward,
and not enough time allocated to formalising how the system was to be used. One of
the team’s longest-serving network architects reflected that most of the data uploading
was done after hours. With over 10,000 department files to upload, getting the legacy
data into the KMS was not going to be easy, particularly because there were no
defined rules on what to upload and what was deemed valuable with respect to the
department’s core function. Business operations do not suddenly cease for the
introduction of new enterprise systems. In addition, some groups viewed as more
important to the organization, had their departmental workspaces allotted well ahead
of other groups, making some groups like the regional research and development
laboratory in Australia, feeling left behind and unimportant to the business at large.
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Figure 6. OpenText Livelink Rollout at Southern Networks
CASE DESCRIPTION
The Fragmented Intranet
It was not that long ago that employees of global companies relied on fragmented web
pages scattered across a multitude of servers throughout the world for their corporate
information needs. Conducting searches for key pieces of data integral to the
successful completion of a task was often a hopeless exercise. More often than not
account project teams had to pour through completely irrelevant hits on the
company’s search engine only to walk away without locating anything of value.
Southern Networks employees working in offices throughout Asia in 1996 for
instance, had limited access to information generated by employees in other regions.
Even within Asia the practice of uploading data onto servers as a means of making
documents available to others was uncommon, save for small software development
teams whose work by its very nature demanded accessibility. File transfer protocol
(FTP) servers were the closest anyone got to sharing data and these were often
analogous to garbage dumps that were cleared periodically to free up server space.
File naming conventions were absent, as was version control, and any other form of
metadata describing individual documents.
Beyond FTP servers, emailing attachments was heavily relied upon to the detriment
of increasing operational costs. Employees in Asia were warned by superiors on
occasion- even by the region’s president- to pick up the telephone instead of emailing,
as the costs for transporting megabytes of data throughout Asia were becoming
exorbitant. A good PowerPoint package for instance could make the rounds of your
inbox even as often as five times from five different sources. It was also a topic of
amusement and debate that original work completed by an employee in one office
(e.g. a newly created Excel model) would make its way across the corporate intranet
and come back several months later by email from another employee unknown to the
original author. Sometimes authorship was even overridden and credit given to
another individual who had simply adapted a few bits and pieces. This could be
considered a form of internal plagiarism, save for the fact that the company
theoretically owned the intellectual property. In other cases, information was emailed
without an audit trail of recipients; there was no concept of privileges (save for
hardcopy documents that contained a front cover distribution list). The word
“confidentiality” acquired different meanings for different people. In fact, releasing a
document to the account team, independent of the level of security clearance placed
on it, meant that it would end up in the hands of customers within days, if not hours,
even if the contents had not yet been fully discussed internally. Stating that something
was “confidential” was like placing a magnet on it for unauthorized disclosure.
On other occasions employees would receive large email attachments that had little, if
anything, to do with their daily work tasks. As ‘downloading-on-demand’ was still
unfeasible given the lack of infrastructure availability and adequate web training,
broadcasting messages would ensure blanket coverage of the employee base and thus
not miss any of the key recipients it was meant for originally. It was not on a few
instances, however, that commercial Southern Networks product pricing lists
(including margins and discount rates for different countries) would make the rounds
of everyone’s email inbox. This was not only a careless practice but competitively
foolish. The telecoms sector is a small world, many employees working at Southern

Networks at the time, had extended family working in opposition vendors,
particularly in the United States. Even worse was that this type of practice was never
identified as strategically perilous by upper management.
At the time the typical departmental setting was one where the majority of working
information was stored on local hard drives instead of a common server with
employees responsible for making their own back-ups of data. At Southern Networks
in Australia key project member’s computers often fell victim to viruses or worms.
And to make matters worse, as if the loss of files was not detrimental enough, back-up
storage procedures for laptops and notebooks were non-existent. Project team
members were often left scrambling to locate older versions of files to meet customer
deadlines, on occasion losing days and even weeks of work and research. Employees
also required numerous passwords for a variety of applications, most of which would
expire or be forgotten. The absence of a central login to company applications was
always a contentious issue as company employees lost valuable time waiting for IT
personnel to reset passwords when they could have been working on important
documents for customer engagements. Smart card secure ID badges were even
deployed to staff in 1997 for remote access but due to synchronization problems they
were abandoned some time later.
The Problem of Knowledge Transfer
The absence of a central portal for employees also meant that individual web-based
applications were unknown unless the exact universal resource locator (URL) was
marketed via email or some other general communications forum. Different
departments within the company may have had their own web pages but again these
were inadequate, poorly maintained and updated, contained broken links, and had a
very small audience with little or no access security on the intranet. Up until 1998,
subordinates in technical support teams like the network planning group relied on the
ingenuity, good name, and goodwill of their supervisors and managers to gather and
socialize important information. For this reason, a good supervisor could fast-track an
associate engineer’s career giving them access to more. Other supervisors would
hoard information, keep it to themselves for the purposes of self-promotion, and then
tell their subordinates that they did not wish to overload them with unnecessary
information. Employees in teams were expected to share their findings with one
another in order to complete tasks but this was not always the company culture. It was
impossible to know who the key experts in the company were for collaborating on
projects, unless an employee was introduced by word-of-mouth or chain-style emails.
To be good at one’s work, more often than not, meant that an individual had to have a
good network of colleagues- knowing the right people could save an employee a great
deal of time, not to mention raising the accuracy of the actual results or solutions
proposed.
Expatriates were often brought in to enhance the transference of knowledge between
the US, the United Kingdom and other more isolated or newly established regions like
Australasia. But no matter how good and strong these internal networks were there
was always a question mark surrounding the vintage of the information sent by key
contacts. Was it the latest product information for instance? Was the plan-of-records
(PoR) the most recently defined? There was not always enough time to check these
very important questions- especially given the time zone differences between Asia
and other Southern Networks offices. One had to go on what they had as it was better

than nothing and at least more accurate than a guesstimate. Sometimes consultants
were seconded to projects for a short time, their access to company information was
even more limited, and so they spent time reinventing the wheel, separated logically
from the rest of the organization.
Collaboration was mainly insular, within project teams, and there was no manner to
denote who did what in the corporation. Even up until 1998, the online corporate
directory only noted the employee’s name, telephone number, location, and reporting
manager. Thus, the problems were not only physical in nature with regard to the
corporate intranet infrastructure but were application-centric as well. Simple Word
documents like company policies were even difficult to locate on local servers. These
factors altogether contributed to a loss of productivity and propagated inefficiencies
across departments. The problem however was not isolated to Southern Networks- all
the other telecommunication giants were suffering likewise. Companies were
struggling with how to manage “knowledge” in large corporations with complex
product and service mixes. The answer was to evolve to a better working environment
that took advantage of internet protocol (IP) and embraced it as a medium of
communication. To this end, in late 1998 all Southern Networks employees were
required to complete a basic IP certification course.
Doing business at web-speed caused dramatic changes not only to the way
information was exchanged but to the way people themselves worked. At about the
same time that SouthTel merged with Fiber Networks and announced the change in
focus from circuit-switched telephony to IP, the company CEO Jamie Ross, decided
to invest in knowledge management (KM) to help facilitate the merger process,
promote knowledge sharing among employees, encourage refinement of business
processes through workflow management leading toward ISO9001 certification, offer
a central login for employees, and assist in employee communications from the top
down and vice versa. Ross was a CEO who sought opinions on particular issues
directly from his employees. He purposefully showed by example, crafting global
memos that were pages long of heart-to-heart reflection. He made employees feel
special, even if they were entry level or worked in support functions. If he shared his
thoughts openly, the mandate was that employees should also share more knowledge
with each other. He urged employees to think together, and create an environment of
openness to help win more business. His decision to implement a corporate-wide
knowledge management system fundamentally came from an organization need to
remain competitive, even though the decision to specifically purchase the Livelink
system was allegedly decided on a golf course.
The Process of Change
Livelink did more than just enforce a technical change in infrastructure layout. It
changed the way people worked and it challenged individual beliefs about ownership
of information. The process of implementing a knowledge management system
(KMS) was more than just about allowing the centralization of information and
enabling the collaboration between individuals in different regions. It was to strike at
the very core of departmental and global business practices. In fact, the
implementation of Livelink coincided with the company’s efforts to attain ISO9001
certification for as many different functional areas as possible. Some departments,
like the Network Planning department in Asia, found the challenge almost impossible.
There was no defined workflow to how employees in designated roles conducted their

studies, and studies varied in time, size, complexity and resource requirements. Some
employees continually insisted to work with local files and share only a selection of
documents with their project team. One of the key architects in the Network Planning
team in Sydney believed that their sophisticated models, if placed in the wrong hands,
could have major repercussions on Australian business. He argued that his tools
contained a great deal of sensitive customer and proprietary information, and if used
inappropriately would mislead other customers or give competing companies unfair
advantage. During the dot.com bubble, it was reported widely by the internal security
team, that industrial espionage was a common happenstance. Southern’s security
personnel warned of a spate of professional crimes that had taken place in the UK,
eventuating in twenty-five stolen laptops in a single quarter, most of which had taken
place at airports and hotel car parks.
Chief knowledge officers (CKOs) were appointed in departments as well as ISO9001
team leaders to help the process overcome initial teething problems. However the use
of an ISO ‘policeman’ in each department put some individuals in some very difficult
situations. Some employees clashed with the ISO mandate which made them
automatically rebel against the use of Livelink when in actual fact the two were
separate requirements. More generally, there was resistance to change toward
Livelink, and a number of employees believed that this was primarily due to the lack
of information provided to employees before the system was rolled out worldwide.
For instance, some employees complained that it was too time consuming to upload
and download relevant data from the KMS and have to record the adequate metadata
for every single document (Table 2). While other employees saw the advantages of
downloading-on-demand and the right to access useful information that could help
make them more effective employees. Chief knowledge managers (CMO) for some of
the larger departments were also appointed to promote the use and benefits of
Livelink but these employees were often ostracized by others who did not respect
their work. Most employees viewed these individuals as an unnecessary company
overhead, claiming that they knew little about how the business worked and were
restricted in what they could bring to teams as they were not involved in the initial
creation of knowledge. Subsequently, the perception was that the need for chief
knowledge managers to come up to speed meant that employees would be disrupted
by incessant questioning.
Table 2. Asia’s Network Planning Team - File Creation and Access (Before Livelink)
Types of Files
Plain Text

Emails
Spreadsheet

Average Number of Files (Viewed,
Created or Modified) by Team
5 per day per user
Files would vary in size from a
couple of kilobytes to 10 megabytes.

200 per day per user (15% of these
containing attachments in excess of 1
megabyte)
Size and complexity of spreadsheet
varied. One workbook could contain
even as many as 15 worksheets of 1
letter page in size each. A model
created in a spreadsheet environment

Who Creates?

Who Has Access?

Few. Or
sourced
directly from
the customer
or a third party
statistical
agency.
Everyone

Highly restricted access
if customer details
contained within file.
Otherwise general
statistics shared to create
realistic assessments of
potential business.
Individual recipient or
project group.

Everyone

Depends if the
spreadsheet was a tool or
contained customer data
or contained
demographics in a region.

Database

could also take 3 days to develop
then another 2 days to refine and
another 5 days to populate and run
various scenarios with the correct
details.
File sizes would vary from 10
kilobytes to 3 megabytes in size.
5 per user per day
Files would vary in size from a
couple of hundred kilobytes to 10
megabytes.

Usually
market
analysts

Anyone who needed the
statistical data.

The actual models
developed were
accessible on a ‘needs
only’ basis and was
dependent on whether the
creator wished to grant
access to other
colleagues. Seldom was
sharing the case unless
multiple resources were
allotted to project.
GIS-skilled personnel

Visual Basic
Code

0.5 per user per day
Typically small file sizes of code that
would need to be compiled and
executed.

Skilled BNP
tool
developers

Geographic
Information
Systems
(AutoCAD,
Mapping,
Satellite and
Aerial Photos)
Presentation
Software

25 per user per day
Very large files exceeding 10
megabytes but depended on scale and
resolution and whether the data was
vector or raster imagery.

Number of
licenses
dependent

10 per user per day
Typically between 300 kilobytes and
10 megabytes. Depended on clip art
used if sales presentation or other file
types embedded with animation.
20 per user per day
Varied from 20 kilobyte file size to
400 kilobytes. With images or graphs
the size could go as large as 2
megabytes.
1 per user per day
File sizes were typically small
depending on what data was exported
for reports.
1 per user per day
File sizes were typically small
depending on what data was exported
for reports.

All

Word
Processing

Proprietary
Project
Management
Software
Third Party
Business Case
Software
Proprietary
Network
Planning and
Dimensioning
Software

5 per user per day
File sizes were typically small
depending on what data was exported
for reports.

Radio Network
Planning
Software

0.05 per user per day
Very large file sizes exceeding 1
megabyte showing wireless signal
strengths and digital elevation, clutter

All

Senior
manager with
assistance
from personnel
Business case
skilled
personnel such
as solutions
advisors.
Solutions
architects who
are versed in
traffic
dimensioning.
Radio
planning
department

If tool-based for training
purposes, all in the
department have access.
Some restrictions on
sales presentations.
All

All

Relevant personnel on
project, particularly
members of the account
team and the customer.
Pre-sales planners who
require an understanding
of a high level bill of
materials (BoM).
Business case developers
need access to the capital
expenditure also.
GIS-skilled personnel.

Adobe Acrobat
Files

10 per user per day
Typically 400 kilobytes to 700
kilobytes.

Competitive
Intelligence
Reports

20 per user per day
Most of the files were in HTML
format not exceeding 300 kilobytes.

Product/techni
cal developers
and human
resource staff.
Third party
suppliers like
Yankee, IDC,
Meta Group

Everyone

Everyone

There were a number of shortcomings related to the KMS in 2000 many of which
were linked to the capacity for Livelink to handle multiple file types, especially object
programming code and geographic information systems (GIS) extensions. Other
issues were about the actual implementation of the system, such as: where did the
given department fit in the global organization structure, how would the department
segment their server space to provide a repository of information that was meaningful
in nature into the future, how could all the features of Livelink be utilized effectively
etc. Timely training of how to use Livelink was also lacking and many of these
courses came post-implementation. Colleagues first heard about Livelink through the
grapevine, in an almost organic fashion, but when some groups had access and others
did not it became a little confusing. The phased deployment plan was never
communicated properly to employees, if at all, in some lines-of-business (LOB).
Livelink definitely required top-level management support but even with this backing
it still took some time for the sceptics to be converted. In essence the CMO was not
saying that files could not be saved locally but that all working files had to be
uploaded in a timely manner. When it came to deciding what kind of sensitive data/
models to upload and who could and should be able to view them, there were some
interesting confrontations. In essence key personnel who were experts in a given area
and were generating their own models to support their work tasks, did not wish to
give up what made them special, for others to easily mimic or learn from with time.
There continued to be some resistance until these same employees began to use access
privileges for their uploaded files and essentially block everybody but themselves
from using particular files. This was not in the true spirit of the KMS but at least this
promoted another level of back-up storage. The facility for a personal (i.e. private)
workspace on Livelink was available but few took advantage of it, opting to place
work documents on the enterprise workspace or store things on their locally hard
drive.
Enter a Knowledge Infra-“structure”
For some departments, the KMS was the answer to gaining timely access to internal
and external intelligence information. For other departments, the KMS would help
them in their quest to raise their profile by providing an avenue to showcase their
work. But before launching any such site, groups had to work together to map out the
layout and structure of their virtual space on the KMS. This was not an easy task
especially for those who had been working with ill-defined processes in the past- they
were not embarking on building a pretty web site but to some degree on aiming for
best practice. The initial brainstorming period raised questions about how work was
being carried out, the type of work being completed in some departments, and the
level of quality and quantity of work being produced in other departments. In effect,
this gave birth to project management demands in the company, and encouraged
visibility and transparency throughout the organization.

The knowledge infrastructure did not appear overnight. Groups worked for weeks and
in some instances, months, to define what they believed would be a “future-proof”
layout. After all, this space was to be the interface between them and the rest of the
Southern Networks world. For the Network Planning team, this required a lot of
collaboration, consultation, and review. It also had to be decided which documents,
past and present, would be ported onto Livelink, how this would be done, and who
would have the responsibility (Figure 7). In the end the manager and chief knowledge
officers did the great majority of this work, believing in the system, and made it
voluntary for other employees in the team to follow suit. It took some months before
the whole group had bought into the idea but the team finally became proficient at
using the KMS. During projects only the crucial documentation would be uploaded to
Livelink and the URL shared with other collaborators. At the conclusion of projects,
all the inputs, processing, and outputs would be uploaded to Livelink. For the
Network Planning team, it was hoped that one day they would be able to use the KMS
to automate their Bill-of-Materials (BoM) sheet for customers’ Request for Quotation
(RFQ). The proposal was to create Adobe PDF forms for “inputting” and use
extensible markup language (XML) to facilitate the end-to-end calculations in
Microsoft Excel or Access. In this way it was hoped that reusable content and
repeatable processes could save employees time and allow them to take on more
projects than in the past, as well as decreasing their time-to-market (TTM). The idea
was to be able to source data that was usually all over the place (in essence distributed
and in different formats), and to put it into some structured context, where it had an
invaluable role. Too often market researchers and financial analysts in the corporation
would spend hours, if not days, searching for the right value- the KMS was about to
change things.

Figure 7. The Network Planning Departmental Workspace (Market-Client-Project)

Initially only a small number of features were being used on Livelink from those
available. For example, although it was possible to “check-in” and “check-out”
documents, hardly anyone ever did. This would have ideally suited employees who
were using databases and financial systems. Employees could also take advantage of
creating metadata for their documentation or define access privileges but very few
ever did. Naming conventions were specified, usually at the department level, but
some documents complied while others did not. In brief, those practices that were preLivelink were difficult to break after the implementation of Livelink, although bit-bybit, change did occur. For example, in the Network Planning team, filenames were
made up of country telephone area codes, the type of task, the initials of the author
and a date and version number. Livelink also allowed for the creation of workflows
for specific projects, allocating tasks and their duration, and other dependencies. It
was not that the feature was not useful but that project management skills were in
short supply.

Portfolio Management
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Figure 8. Toward an Integrated Knowledge Infrastructure
To some degree, the majority of the corporation was using Livelink as a Document
Management System (DMS) in the beginning, but this changed as time went on and
new applications were specifically created to help the employees of the corporation
communicate and collaborate better. The notion of virtual teams became prevalent
around the year 2000, and this is when the KMS became very important (Figure 8).
Customers also, for example, were given access to an extranet space in Livelink
where they could upload and share files with Southern. Account teams also made use
of this capability to gather as much intelligence from clients and provide
commensurate returns to them with product knowledge that was not accessible to the
public via the external corporate site www.southernnetworks.com. Livelink helped
consolidate and strengthen business relationships. Within six months of its
introduction the benefits of the KMS were evident. Remote dial-up access users
especially found it much easier to send around a URL embedded in an email than

having to wait over one hour to attach a file to an email and then send it to a list of
recipients. It saved time and made employees more productive. One manager even
credited the KMS to a growth in the number of patents generated by Southern
Networks. In the past the organization was very customer responsive at the expense of
their knowledge creation- Livelink facilitated this business process (Perna 2001).
Knowledge Management Applications
By the end of 2000, the knowledge management system was increasingly being touted
as Southern’s most important corporate tool. It not only brought teams closer together
that were previously geographically disparate but it formed the basis for the launch of
the company’s key communication and collaboration applications including: Southern
Portal, Strategic Advisor, Market Analyzer, Customer Aware, Sales.Channel, World
Database Watcher, Corporate ID, Organization Structure, PeopleFind, Building
Locator, EmployeeOnline, CareerDev, Employee Training and Development,
Information Services, MeetingsOnline, Purchase Online, Travel Online and Stock
Price, among others. Southern Portal let the CEO directly broadcast multimedia clips
to all the employees in the corporation. Employees could watch the broadcast live, or
download a broadcast and watch it later using Media Player. Southern Portal also
reported the latest customer wins, highlighted key account and product strategies, and
identified key employees and groups in the corporation. There were also a number of
applications that supported sales-technical and marketing activities including:
Sales.Channel, Customer Aware, Market Analyzer, and Strategic Advisor. Employees
could use these portals to search for information about products, target markets, client
backgrounds, and business case examples from across the globe. This knowledge
empowered individuals and groups to produce higher quality output.
Although employees performing searches on the Intranet would argue that results
returned were information overload at times, this was better than days gone by, when
no data whatsoever was available. The assumed information overload problem could
also help employees by allowing them to compare facts from a variety of sources, and
grant them the ability to make a decision on which data was the most useful for a
given project. Employees could also quickly ascertain who their counterparts were in
other regions and who would be a likely collaborator for advice on technical matters.
While collaborative tools like MeetingsOnline and NetMeeting were not a
consequence of Livelink, they were taken advantage of more, because employees
were made aware of the services via the KMS. The applications were paramount to
those employees who made use of them every single day and multiple times a day.
Livelink had become so embedded in practice that when the Code Red worm infected
servers it knocked out two days of productivity for most groups. Without access to the
KMS, people could only use the telephone to communicate (if they had the name of
the person they wished to contact), read printed matter and or use electronic resources
on their local desktop.
CURRENT CHALLENGES/PROBLEMS FACING THE ORGANIZATION
In 2001, after dozens upon dozens of acquisitions, the company began to downsize as
a direct consequence of the dot.com crash. At the time the share price of the company
had reached some ninety-nine US dollars at its peak, and at its lowest fell to below
one US dollar. The regime to downsize, in some cases meant that whole departments
were made redundant- irrespective of the top talent within it- and this had a major
repercussion on the value of the KMS in the organization. Members from one school

of thought could argue that the introduction of Livelink was “just-in-time”, that it had
taken root as an important tool before the downsizing was announced. Members from
another school of thought could argue that the value of the KMS decreased after the
rapid downsizing measures were enacted. Independent of the view taken the reality
was that the KMS did help to retain corporate knowledge but it did not do so without
end.
The challenge for those still employed by the company was first to know about the
knowledge (in some instances it had been made private or read access only), and
second if obtainable to know what to do with the information and how to use it. While
some documentation was still used after the departure of the document creator, in
most instances, employees felt they had to generate a lot of new material. In Southern
Networks what became clear was that there was an intrinsic link between knowledge
management and collaboration; take the collaborator away and the knowledge
available to you lessens in worth significantly. The company continued to take drastic
downsizing measures from 90,000 employees in 2001 to some 30,000 employees in
2004. Having cut about 60,000 jobs in three years the KMS could no longer expect to
work miracles. The KMS once alive and used by so many, no longer had the same
number of employees “feeding” it with information. Some employees, desperate to
remain employed, even retreated to pre-Livelink practices, refusing to share their
information with others, hoping that that would maintain their employability
throughout the downsizing spiral.
The value of knowledge management to large multinational corporations is
undisputed (Housel, 2001). KMS is integral in organizations today that work at webspeed and require the creation of virtual teams who rely on reusable content and
repeatable processes. Knowledge management does grant competitive advantage
(Tata, 2005). However it needs to be emphasized that a KMS is not just a technology
that can be implemented and can succeed on its own. It is people who will ultimately
drive its success or failure- it is embedded in practices people follow and in culture,
i.e. the way people go about doing things. If used correctly KMS benefits are
manifold including a dynamic working and learning environment that fosters
information sharing and new value creation. Knowledge management helps
employees build a collaborative culture, and create and extend their own personal
business networks. Indeed there is a social side to this e-business solution. At no other
time does this “socio-cultural” phenomenon become most obvious than when it is
disrupted by necessary corrective actions to an organization’s size. In the case of
Southern Networks employees, it was wonderful to share and create together until the
threat of redundancies loomed and subsequently affected social practice. In times of
downsizing the “one big happy family” culture is quickly overtaken by the “everyone
for himself” reality and this has the effect of stifling the value of a KMS in the shortterm, especially as employee morale is generally low during these times of substantial
change. It does not mean that the KMS loses its value altogether, to some degree it
becomes increasingly important because there are less heads working together to
solve the same number of problems. As the organization again reaches equilibrium
the KMS can be used as a catalyst to re-build, re-create, and re-store.
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APPENDIX
Table 3. Southern’s Strategic Objectives in 2000
Right Angle Turn:
- Move from being a manufacturer of voice only telecommunications equipment to
offering IP-centric solutions
Outsourcing and Contracts:
- Limit involvement in manufacturing and repairs and develop relationships with
smaller contract players for supply
Business Processes:
- Streamline operations to compete with market leaders in unified networks market
Expansion:
- Form new alliances and acquire for faster time to market
E-business Strategy:
- Become involved in application service provisioning
Table 4. Southern Networks’ Strengths vs. Weaknesses (1999)

Strengths:
- Major player in optical internet and high speed networks
- Large customer base which is diversified
- Expand broad product portfolio with diverse solutions (one stop shop)
Weaknesses:
- Time to market does not align with major competitors
- Do not meet industry benchmarking indices (e.g. revenue per employee)
- Brand awareness
Table 5. Livelink Installation Specification
Livelink Server Platform
• Intel
Operating Systems:
• NT Server 4.0
Web Servers
• Microsoft IIS 4.0 (CGI and ISAPI)
• Netscape iPlanet Web Server Enterprise
Databases
• Oracle 8i 8.16 Enterprise Edition
• MS SQL-Server 7.0
Web Browser Platform
• Windows 2000 Professional
Web Browser
• Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.01

